http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-persian-knot
BERLIN – The
negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, plus Germany, over Iran’s nuclear program are entering a new,
and probably decisive, stage. The negotiations have been going on for almost a
decade, with long interruptions, and whether a breakthrough will come this time
is anyone’s guess. But the situation has never been as serious as it is today,
and peace hangs in the balance.
Illustration
by Chris Van Es
After the recent
visits by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to Washington, DC, and by
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Tehran, a foggy situation
is nonetheless becoming clearer. It appears that US President Barack Obama has
won time by drawing a line in the sand – the start of an explicit Iranian
nuclear-weapons program – and by assuring Israel of America’s readiness for
military action should negotiations fail.
Moreover, in view
of the danger of a military confrontation, the United States, together with
Europe and other partners, has implemented tough new “smart” sanctions aimed at
Iran’s oil exports – its main source of income – while largely isolating the
Islamic Republic from the international payment system. Iran urgently needs the
oil revenue, and, without participation in the payments system, its
international trade is grinding to a halt. Barter transactions and suitcases
full of cash are not a viable alternative. So Iran’s economy is being shaken to
the core.
Furthermore, the US
seems to have communicated in a credible manner both the seriousness of the
situation and its own intentions to the Iranian leadership via various channels.
So, if this round of negotiations, too, should fail, a great – and entirely
foreseeable – tragedy could begin to unfold.
The good news is
that all of the parties involved seem to be aware of this, which should focus
official minds on a serious negotiation process and a diplomatic solution. Moreover,
it should be clear soon enough whether Iran is serious about a compromise this
time, because there are ample benchmarks.
The content of such
a compromise is more or less clear: acceptance of low-grade uranium enrichment
by Iran for non-military purposes, and enhanced and verifiable safeguards, such
export of low-grade enriched uranium for further processing and stronger and
more extensive inspection rights for the International Atomic Energy Agency
inside Iran. For example, the IAEA would gain access to previously closed
Iranian nuclear facilities.
Of course, a
compromise would not address the Iranian regime’s domestic behavior and
regional ambitions – a source of shared angst for Israel and the Arab Gulf states,
first and foremost Saudi Arabia. But, with no one seriously prepared to go to
war for regime change in Iran, particularly after the decade-long misadventure
in Iraq, no one should weigh down the negotiations with futile aspirations.
This applies equally
to Iran, where some influential people still think that the US can be forced
out of the Middle East, and that the status quo can be changed to
install Iran as the region’s hegemonic power. This illusion, no less than
Western hopes of regime change in Iran, could be seriously pursued only at an
indefensibly high risk of war and regional chaos.
Other significant
factors will play an important role in deciding the outcome of these
negotiations. The first concerns Iranian domestic politics and the ongoing power
struggle within the regime – a struggle that scuttled a diplomatic
solution once before, because neither conservatives nor reformers were willing
to afford President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a diplomatic triumph. One can only hope
that, in view of the seriousness of the situation, this route to failure will
be closed off.
Developments in
Syria, Iran’s last remaining ally in the region, are equally likely to play a
role. The fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime would amount to a
strategic debacle for Iran , which would then be faced by a united front of
Arab states, supported by Turkey, the US, and, in a way, by Israel. Iran would
then find it difficult to maintain its foothold in Lebanon, and its position
would become more complicated even in Iraq, despite its Shia majority. In
short, its quest for regional predominance would collapse.
In light of the
complexity of external factors, it will be important not to overload the
nuclear negotiations with issues that the talks are not designed to resolve. Syria,
the future of Iran’s regime, the situation in the Persian Gulf and in the wider
region: all of these problems must be addressed at a different level and at
another time if the risk of war over Iran’s nuclear program is to be contained
or avoided.
Ever since
Alexander the Great memorably solved the puzzle of the Gordian knot with just a
blow of his sword, people have dreamed of a simple military solution to complex
problems. But, all too often, applying military force to a problem leads to
more problems. In Iraq, George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld
demonstrated that using military force only as a last resort is not merely an
ethical and moral imperative, but one based on Realpolitik as well.
There
are times when using military force becomes unavoidable, but it should never be
chosen as an alternative to diplomacy. That is certainly true for today’s
“Persian Knot.” Yet that choice – war or diplomacy – now confronts both sides